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THE INTRICACIES OF HYPOTHETICAL
QUESTIONS*
ARNOLD J. CANE**
I. TaE LAW
In a case going back to the territorial days of Wisconsin, about 115
years ago, Pinney reports that of Luning v. State,' decided at the Janu-
ary 1849 term of the territorial supreme court.
Luning was tried in the Circuit Court of Washington County for
erecting a mill-dam near the village of Cedarburg on a stream passing
through the town. It was charged that the health of the citizens was
injured because of the unpleasant and unwholesome vapors arising
therefrom. (There was testimony to the effect that before the erection
of the dam there was general good health, but afterwards universal
sickness, "there not being enough in health to administer to the necessi-
ties of the sick,"2 and the stench from the dam being so intolerable
that the inhabitants were compelled to close their doors and windows
and resort to other expedients to remove its influence.) A Dr. Whitney
was present all during the trial. The defense called him to the stand
and propounded the following question to him: "You state you heard
all the evidence given on this trial; now, from that evidence, did Luning's
mill-pond, in your opinion, cause the sickness spoken of by the wit-
nesses ?",3 The trial judge sustained an objection to this question. The
territorial supreme court ruled that in this the trial judge was correct:
The answer to this question would have been an opinion as to
the general merits of the cause, the weighing of conflicting testi-
mony, and swearing to a legal conclusion; in fact, usurping the
province of the jury. The facts, as given in evidence, might have
been stated to the witness, and then his opinion upon them would
have been competent; or he might have given his opinion upon a
similar case, hypothetically stated.4
Less than fifty years later, in a case appealed to the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin from the Third Circuit, one of the author's predecessors,
Judge Burnell, was reversed in Maitland v. Gilbert Paper Co.5 Mait-
* This article is based on a paper presented at the summer meeting of the
Board of Circuit Judges of Wisconsin in August 1964.
** Ph.B., Marquette University (1935) ; LL.B., Marquette University (1937);
judge, Third Judicial Circuit, State of Wisconsin (1962-1964) ; judge, criminal
and juvenile courts, County Court of Winnebago County (1960-1962) ; mem-
ber, Wisconsin Assembly (1950-1960) ; member, American Bar Association
and American Judicature Society; formerly president, Winnebago County Bar
Association, and governor, State Bar of Wisconsin.
'2 Pin. 215 (Wis. 1849).
2 Id. at 219.
3 Id. at 220.
4 Ibid.
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land, an engineer at the paper company in Menasha, had his left eye
destroyed when a water glass which had been installed for the purpose
of indicating the water height in the steam boiler exploded in his face.
Judge Burnell had allowed the plaintiff, under objection, to answer the
question: "What, in your opinion, was the cause of the explosion of
the glass ?"o
In an opinion written by Justice Marshall, our supreme court held
that "where. evidentiary facts, upon which the fact in issue depends,
are in dispute, opinion evidence as to the ultimate fact must be given
upon a hypothetical case."'7 Justice Marshall also wrote: "The rule is
that experts are not to decide issues of fact, hence all questions calling
for opinion evidence must be so framed as not to pass upon the credi-
bility of any other evidence in the case, else it will usurp the province
of the jury or the court.""
These two cases, dating back 115 years and sixty-seven years, re-
spectively, are recalled by way of introduction chiefly to point out that
the law of Wisconsin on the subject of hypothetical questions is of long
standing. It has been little changed in succeeding years.
In Hamann v. Milw. Bridge Co.9 and Schwantes v. State,10 the
court held that "the scope of expert evidence is not [restricted to mat-
ters of science, art or skill]. It extends to every subject in respect to
which one may derive, by experience, special and peculiar knowledge." 1
On October 30, 1962, the supreme court handed down its decision
in the case of Kreyer v. Farmers' Co-operative Lumber Co.? in which
Justice Wilkie reviewed the law as to hypothetical questions. An appeal
from Judge Varnum's circuit, Buffalo County, the case involved a claim
for fire damages to barns and equipment by the plaintiff, Kreyer, who
charged that the fire was the result of faulty electrical work done by
the defendant, Farmers' Co-operative, on the day of the fire.
An objection to a hypothetical question asked of one Sherman, an
expert called by the plaintiff, to the effect "was the barn fire caused by
faulty wiring ?'1 3 was sustained by Judge Varnum on the ground that
it invaded the province of the jury. In this the supreme court held that
Judge Varnum erred, citing the cases hereinbefore mentioned and
others. On the other hand, the court approved of Judge Varnum's
ruling on the objection of the defendant that there was not the proper
foundation for the question. After reciting in some detail what the
6 Id. at 483, 72 N.W. at 1127.
7 Id. at 484, 72 N.W. at 1127.
s Ibid.
9 127 Wis. 550, 106 N.W. 1081 (1906).
10 127 Wis. 160, 106 N.W. 237 (1906).
11 127 Wis. at 565, 106 N.W. at 1086.
'1218 Wis. 2d 67, 117 N.W. 2d 646 (1962).
is Id. at 75, 117 N.W. 2d at 651.
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testimony had been prior to the putting of the question to Sherman,
the plaintiff's expert witness, Justice Wilkie wrote:
In ruling on a hypothetical question or on any other expert testi-
mony, the trial court must be in a position to insist upon a proper
foundation being laid before it allows the question to be an-
swered. The entire premise here as stated by plaintiff's counsel
was devoid of any assumption as to evidence pointing to the
electrical system as the cause of the fire so that the conclusion
called for would be pure speculation and conjecture. There was
lack of foundation... .14 (Footnote omitted.)
In addition to summarizing the law relating to hypothetical ques-
tions on the two points mentioned, Justice Wilkie, writing for the entire
court, discussed the law as to objections required to be specific, not
general. During the trial, Judge Varnum and all counsel retired to
chambers to discuss the objection and the question. The record, how-
ever, disclosed that at no time was the objection detailed. The objection
was general, to the effect that the question "assumed facts not in evi-
dence." Justice Wilkie declared that the "objection to the question on
the general ground that it 'assumes facts not in evidence' was not spe-
cific enough to be sustained." 15
A quick reference is here made to some other general rules relating
to hypothetical questions, as set forth in Wisconsin cases:
(1) Moore v. Ellis:16 The witnesses' testimony is not conclusive
upon a court sitting without a jury; it is merely advisory.
(2)Plainse v. Engle:'7 The testimony of a medical expert upon the
question of mental competency may not be disregarded unless it is im-
peached.
(3) Foster v. Fidelity & Cas. Co.:1s The question must show the
facts upon which the opinion is based and must exclude hearsay.
(4) Sundquist v. Madison Ry. Co.:19 A doctor may base his opinion,
in part, on reports of a hospital technician.
(5) Leora v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry. :20 Medical history
obtained, in part, from someone other than the patient may, in particu-
lar situations, be admissible. 21
(6) Estate of Scherrer:22 The question must include undisputed
14 Id. at 81, 117 N.W. 2d at 654. Reference was made to McGaw v. Wassmann,
263 Wis. 486, 57 N.W. 2d 920 (1953) ; McCORMIcK, EVIDENCE § 14, at 29-32(1954); JONES, EVIDENCE § 371, at 694 (4th ed. 1932) ; 32 C. J. S. EVIDENCE
§ 522, at 220-21 (1958).
15 Id. at 79, 117 N.W. 2d at 653. The case of Cornell v. State, 104 Wis. 527, 80
N.W. 745 (1899), was cited as directly in point, and page 534 of that case
was quoted. Reference was also made to 6 AM. JUR. EVIDENCE § 788 (1939).
1689 Wis. 108, 61 N.W. 291 (1894).
17262 Wis. 506, 56 N.W. 2d 89 (1952).
1899 Wis. 447, 75 N.W. 69 (1898).
19 197 Wis. 83, 221 N.W. 392 (1928).
20 156 Wis. 386, 146 N.W. 520 (1914).
21 The subject, including this case, was discussed in 175 A.L.R. 282 (1948).
22242 Wis. 211, 7 N.W. 2d 848 (1942).
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facts, and must also include all facts necessary to be considered in ar-
riving at a correct answer.
(7) Sharp v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Co.:23 The defend-
ant's question need not include plaintiff's testimony that she had no
trouble with her elbow prior to the accident.
(8) Kiekhoefer v. Hildershide:24 The question may disregard the
adversary's theory of the case.
(9) Selleck v. City of Janesville:2 5 The mere fact that the question
is, in part, based upon the personal examination and knowledge of the
physician does not make it objectionable.
(10) Feldstein v. Harrington:26 An expert is not precluded from
giving his opinion in answer to hypothetical questions because he has
personal knowledge of the case and might testify directly, but he may
also give his opinion based on hypothetical facts, or upon such facts
and facts within his knowledge; to sustain an objection on that ground
is error.27
(11) Kath v. Wisconsin Cent. Ry. :28 A doctor may not state what he
learns entirely from medical works, unsupported by practical experi-
ence of his own.
(12)Zoedoski v. State:29 On cross-examination, the medical expert
cannot be questioned on a hypothesis having no foundation in the facts.
He may be cross-examined on facts which the cross-examiner claims
he has proved, provided such examination is confined within the pos-
sible or probable range of facts.
(13) Marsh Woods Products Co. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. :30 Medi-
cal textbooks are not admissible in evidence.
(14) Bell v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co.:31 While the device
of reading excerpts while cross-examining is not permissible, when the
expert denies any authority a short extract can be used.
(15) Kuroske v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. :2 Opinion evidence carries no
weight when it in turn is based upon the opinions or conclusions of
other witnesses.
(16) Vogelsburg v. Mason & Hanger Co. :3 The opinion of an
expert cannot be invoked to supply the substantive facts necessary to
support his conclusion; the opinion of the expert does not constitute
proof of the existence of the facts necessary to support the opinion.
23 18 Wis. 2d 467, 118 N.W. 2d 905 (1962).
2 113 Wis. 280, 89 N.W. 189 (1902).
25 100 Wis. 157, 75 N.W. 975 (1898).
26 4 Wis. 2d 380, 90 N.W. 2d 566 (1957).
27The subject is discussed in considerable detail in 82 A.L.R. 1338-39 (1938).
28121 Wis. 503,99 N.W. 217 (1904).
2982 Wis. 580, 52 N.W. 778 (1892).
30 207 Wis. 209, 240 N.W. 392 (1932).
31 169 Wis. 407, 172 N.W. 791 (1919).32 234 Wis. 394, 291 N.W. 384 (1940).
- 250 Wis. 242, 26 N.W. 2d 678 (1947).
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(17) Curran v. Stang Co.: 34 The fact that the jury must find reason-
able certainty from all the evidence does not make it necessary that
every witness must testify to the fact or reasonable certainty.
(18) Sundquist v. Madison Ry. : 3 A jury's finding of reasonable
certainty may be based on testimony that such a result may "probably"
follow or is "likely," "liable," or "apt" to follow the accidental injury.
(19) Only a medical expert is qualified to express an opinion to a
medical certainty or based on medical probabilities (not mere possi-
bilities) as to whether or not the pain will continue in the future.3 6
(20) Walraven v. Sprague, Warner & Co.:" Mere possibilities
leave the solution of an issue of fact in the field of conjecture and
speculation to such an extent as to afford no basis for inferences to a
reasonable certainty, and in the absence of at least such inferences there
is no sufficient basis for a finding of fact.
(21) Will of MlcGovern:38 Any infirmity in the hypothesis attaches
to the answer predicated upon it.
(22) Fehrman v. Smirl:39 Grounded upon the rule in Wisconsin
that the use of res ipsa loquitur is one involving a permissable infer-
ence (as contrasted to a rebuttable presumption), an instruction em-
bodying the principle of res ipsa loquitur may be based on expert medi-
cal testimony in a malpractice action, but the case must, of course, first
qualify for the res ipsa loquitur instruction.
II. THE QUESTION
While hypothetical questions are by no means limited to medical
experts, in practice the majority of them will be of such nature. There-
fore, it is appropriate to use examples from this field in a consideration
of the framing of questions.
After the medical witness has qualified as an expert, the question
itself ought to include the following:
(1) Informative description of the person involved (sex, age,
weight, height, and prior condition of health).
(2) Date and scene of the accident.
(3) Description of the accident itself (judges know all too well
3498 Wis. 598, 74 N.W. 377 (1898).
- 197 Wis. 83, 221 N.W. 392 (1928).
36For further consideration of the subject of "possibilities" vs. "probabilities,"
see Creamery Package Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 211 Wis. 326, 248 N.W.
140 (1933); Miller Rasmussen Ice & Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 263
Wis. 538, 57 N.W. 2d 736 (1953); Molinaro v. Industrial Comm'n, 273 Wis.
129, 76 N.W. 2d 547 (1956); Michalski v. Wagner, 9 Wis. 2d 22, 100 N.W.
2d 354 (1960); In re Kitz Estate, 13 Wis. 2d 49, 108 N.W. 2d 116 (1961);
Rogers v. Adams, 19 Wis. 2d 141, 119 N.W. 2d 349 (1963); and Bleyer v.
Gross, 19 Wis. 2d 305, 120 N.W. 2d 130 (1963).
37235 Wis. 259, 292 N.W. 883 (1940).
38241 Wis. 99, 3 N.W. 2d 717 (1942).
3920 Wis. 2d 1, 121 N.W. 2d 255 (1963).
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that the framer of the question will include the most favorable version
possible of disputed facts).
(4) Description of tests, investigations, and examinations (including
both objective and subjective symptoms).
(5) Description of recent developments (including the latest ex-
amination and present condition and complaints).
(6) Conclude by inquiring to a reasonable medical probability or
certainty both as to causal connection between the accident and injury,
and permanent nature, if any.
(7) Form of conclusion: "Now, Doctor, assuming all these factors
to be true, have 'you an opinion, based upon a reasonable medical cer-
tainty, and from a medical and surgical point of view, as to whether
or not there is a causal connection between the accident described and
the injuries sustained as set forth in this question ?"
(8) Continuing: "Doctor, assuming the same hypothetical person,
and the same hypothesis, have you an opinion, based upon reasonable
medical certainty, and from a medical and surgical standpoint, as to
whether the condition, as described, is permanent or temporary?"
(9) If the hypothetical question is" dispensed with, then the con-
necting and causal question can be put to the expert witness as follows:
"Now, Doctor, in your opinion, based upon a reasonable medical cer-
tainty, was the accident described to you by the plaintiff in the history
you have mentioned, a competent and producing cause of the injuries
you found ?"
All of us have been aware, both in our trial court practice as lawyers
and in our judicial experience, that the question of whether or not a
hypothetical question ought to be used at the trial involves the consid-
eration of many factors. Often a hypothetical question is not needed,
but the opportunity of rehashing the testimony, done artfully, is dif-
ficult to reject. Surely if the question is not too long, put simply, with
facts accurately stated, it can be both interesting and persuasive. Not
only should the question be prepared before trial (subject to be modified
to include the facts as given at the trial), but a trial brief should be
addressed to the proposition for the benefit of the judge in ruling on
the objections which are sure to come.
Chapter 23 of the book Anatomy of a Murder by Robert Traver40
contains what to me is the best hypothetical question, even though the
law of Michigan on the subject of insanity as a defense to charge of
murder is different than that of Wisconsin.
After slowly and carefully qualifying the thirty-five year old psy-
40 This was the author's pseudonym; his real name is John D. Voelker, born
in northern Michigan in 1903, admitted to the Michigan bar in 1928, prose-
cuting attorney of Marquette County, Michigan, from 1935 to 1950, and
member of the Michigan Supreme Court from 1957 to 1960, retiring in 1960
to write more books, including Small Town D.A.
1t964..65]
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chiatrist, Dr. Matthew Smith, the defense attorney, Paul Biegler, by
whom the entire book was written in the first person, related:
I paused. We were coming to the crucial hypothetical question
over which Parnell (not Andy!) and I had worked so long and
given so much thought. The hypothetical question was one of the
law's more urbane fictions, a convenient sort of legal make-
believe by which counsel, when examining an expert witness
called by it, wrapped up all the facts and issues and pet theories
of his case in a sort of neat legal grab bag and pelted it at the
expert witness for his opinion and conclusion. It at least merci-
fully possessed the highly desirable quality of saving time.
'Doctor,' I said, 'I ask you whether you and 1 have hereto-
fore reviewed together a hypothetical question based upon the
issue of possible insanity in this case?'
'We have.'
I advanced to the Judge's bench. 'Your Honor,' I said, 'I
hand you a copy of our hypothetical question.' I walked over to
Mitch's table. 'I also hand counsel a copy.' I returned to my table.
'With the Court's permission I should now like to read into the
record our hypothetical question.'
The Judge nodded. 'Read away,' he said, and the court re-
porter rolled up his eyes and seemed to brace himself for the
expected flood of words, in which he was not disappointed.
'Thank you, Your Honor,' I said, and began reading. 'Doctor,
assume that a man of 36 is a First Lieutenant in the United
States Army; that he was a combat veteran of World War II
and the Korean War; that he returned to his country from
Korea in 1953 and for a time was assigned to special military
duty in various places. That in July of this year he was assigned
to duty in a remote logging and resort village in the Upper
Peninsula of Michigan. That he was married to an attractive and
vivacious woman 5 years his senior. That these two were and are
much in love with each other. That they lived in a trailer in a
public park in said village. That the social and recreational
facilities of said village were limited. That one of the few public
recreational places they could conveniently go to was a neighbor-
ing hotel bar. That because of his long overseas service and the
further fact that he was on loan from his own outfit the Lieuten-
ant had few acquaintances among local Army personnel. That
he occasionally went to the hotel bar when off duty and that his
social relations with the civilian proprietor were cordial though
in no sense intimate. Assume further, Doctor, that at approxi-
mately 9:00 P.M. on Friday, August 15th, the wife of the
Lieutenant went to this tavern to get some beer and play pinball
and that the Lieutenant went to bed and slept and that at ap-
proximately 11:45 P.M. he was suddenly wakened. That he
hurriedly got up and thereupon heard a series of screams. That
he then met his wife at the door of his trailer. That she was
sobbing and breathless and hysterical. That she finally told him
that the proprietor of the hotel had threatened her life and as-
saulted and raped her; that he had again just assaulted her and
beaten and kicked her. That she was badly bruised and beaten.
[Vol. 48
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That her skirt was ripped and her underpants were missing. That
the Lieutenant spent upwards of an hour attempting to calm and
comfort and minister to his wife. That during this time she told
him the details of the threats and assaults and beatings. That
during this time he wiped a fluid from his wife's leg which he
believed to be seminal fluid. Assume further, Doctor, that this
Lieutenant reasonably believed that the man whom he believed
had just assaulted and threatened and raped his wife was an ex-
pert pistol shot and that he kept pistols about his premises and
possibly on his person. That he himself kept a loaded Luger auto-
matic pistol in his trailer for protection. That his mind was in a
turmoil over what he believed had just happened to his wife,
and over her present condition. That he finally determined to
seek out said hotel bar proprietor and grab him and hold him
for the police. That while he felt considerable anger and loathing
and contempt for the proprietor he had at no time any intention
of killing or harming him but felt that if the man made one bad
move he would have killed him. That he went and got his pistol
without his wife's knowledge and left his wife in the trailer and
proceeded toward this tavern. That he does not remember what
time it was or precisely how he got to the tavern. That he finally
got to the tavern and entered it. That he saw the proprietor
standing alone behind the bar watching him. That he then ad-
vanced in the bar and proprietor whirled around and the Lieuten-
ant produced his pistol and pointed it at the proprietor and emp-
tied its contents into his body, leaning over the bar to do so.
That he had and has no conscious recollection of his act. That
he then turned and left the tavern and proceeded toward his
trailer. That he does not remember anything after he entered the
tavern other than as indicated until he got home to the trailer.
That he then first observed that the pistol was empty; that he
then told his wife that he had shot the tavern proprietor. That
he then notified the deputized caretaker of the trailer camp of
what he had done. That he waited in his trailer for the police
and was subsequently arrested and charged with murder. As-
sume further, Doctor, that this man had never before in his life-
time been arrested for or convicted of any criminal offense,
including any civilian act of violence toward another human
being.' I paused and caught my breath. 'Now, Doctor, assuming
all the facts herein stated to be true, have you an opinion based
upon a reasonable psychiatric certainty as to whether or not it
is probable that the hypothetical man was in a condition of emo-
tional disorganization so as to be temporarily insane?'
'I have.'
'What is that opinion?'
'That he was temporarily insane at the time of the shooting.'
Then, of course, followed a lengthy discussion in which the defense
attorney questioned the doctor for further elaboration on the mental
condition of the hypothetical man, including the psychiatric bases for
opinions expressed.
Chapter 23, surrounding the hypothetical question, and chapter 24,
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the cross examination of the psychiatrist, are, from the standpoint of
a judge and lawyer, the most interesting and informative of the book.
III. COMMENT
The dignity afforded to hypothetical questions in Wisconsin, as seen
from the cases dating back to the territorial days of our state, is not
universal.
For example, the Model Code of Evidence, as well as the uniform
acts, would eliminate the device of hypothetical questions and allow
precisely what was attempted in the Luning mill-dam case of 115 years
ago. Both rule 58 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence and section 9 of
the Uniform Act on Expert Testimony provide substantially as follows:
Questions calling for the opinion of an expert witness need
not be hypothetical in form unless the judge in his discretion so
requires, but the witness may state his opinion and reasons
therefor without first specifying data on which it is based as
an hypothesis, or otherwise; but upon cross examination he may
be required to specify such data.
The text book used in the law schools of Wisconsin and frequently
cited with approval by our Wisconsin Supreme Court, McCormick on
Evidence, asks this question: "Should the Hypothetical Question Be
Retained ?"41 To back up his contention that the legal writers who
have studied the problem condemn the use of hypothetical questions,
McCormick gives two examples:
(1) Wigmore declares that "it is a strange irony that the hypo-
thetical question, which is one of the truly scientific features of the
rules of Evidence, should have become that feature which does most
to disgust men of science with the law of Evidence. '42
(2) Judge Learned Hand described the hypothetical question as
the "most horrific and grotesque wen on the fair face of justice. ' '43
While admitting that the hypothetical question is an "ingenious
and logical device" 44 for assisting a jury to have the benefit of the
views of experts in a case, McCormick charges that it is a "failure in
practice and an obstruction to the administration of justice. ' 45 He
charges that by permitting counsel to pick out those material facts he
wants in stating the question, the courts permit a one-sided hypothesis.
On the other hand, if counsel is required to include all relevant facts,
then an "intolerably wordy" question results. He quotes from two ex-
pert witnesses to show what he considers the principal weakness of
the practice; namely, the slanting of the hypothesis:
(1)Dr. William A. White declared: "In a large experience, I have
4x 'MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 16, at 33-34 (1954).
422 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 686 (3d ed. 1940).
43 NE\w YORK BAR Ass'N, LECTURES ON LEGAL ToPrcs (1921-1922).
44 MCCORMICK, Op. cit. supra note 41, at 33.
-5 Ibid
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never known a hypothetical question, in a trial involving the mental
condition of the defendant, which, in my opinion, offered a fair pre-
sentation of the case."24 6
(2) Dr. Harold S. Hulbert wrote: "But the present practice of mis-
using a hypothetical question as restatement of the case to re-impress
the jury is bad strategy, though good tactics; bad strategy because it is
so unfair, confusing and degrading that it does not clarify the issue nor
help achieve justice. 47
Addressing himself to the remedy, McCormick, after remarking
that it would be impractical to insist that the trial judge make the re-
quired study of the case in order to choose what facts should be in-
cluded in the question, writes that in Michigan the courts follow the
practice of framing the question by all counsel in conference with the
judge, either at the pre-trial or during the trial in the absence of the
jury (some of us here have frequently done this). He says, however,
that these devices are
wasteful of time and effort. The only remaining expedient is the
one generally advocated, namely, that of dispensing with the
requirement that the question be accompanied by a recital of an
hypothesis, unless the proponent elects to use the hypothetical
form, or unless the trial judge in his discretion shall require it.
It will be for the cross-examiner to bring out if he so desires,
the bases for the expert's opinion. Manifestly, this does not lessen
the partisanship of the question or the answer, but it does greatly
simplify the examination, and removes the occasion for imperil-
ing the judgment by mistakes in the form of hypothetical ques-
tions.48 (Footnotes omitted.)
McCormick also addresses himself to the broader subject of "Pro-
posals for Improvement of the Practice Relating to Expert Testi-
mony." 49 Summarizing what he said about this, it appears that while
he recognizes the distinct advantages of the adversary system, including
the initiative of opposing parties in gathering and presenting proofs,
McCormick contends that there are two weaknesses of the system in-
sofar as expert evidence is concerned. The first he considers to be the
growing tendency in choosing experts not on the basis of who is the
best expert but who is the best witness; the second, the method of
presenting expert testimony at the trial, too often resulting not in a
dispassionate presentation but instead an overemphasis on conflicts in
the opinions of experts which juries cannot really intelligently resolve.
McCormick deplores the "battle of experts" type of trial.
To reduce the partisan element in selecting experts to testify (or
46 WHITE, INSANITY AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 56 (1923).
4 Hulbert, Psychiatric Testimony in Probate Proceedings, 2 LAW & CoNTEaMP.
PROB. 448,455 (1935).
48 McCORMICK, op. cit. supra note 41, at 34.
49 Id. at 34-38.
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to make reports), McCormick recommends that trial judges make
greater use of their inherent powers to call experts. This idea has been
embodied in statutes and rules of courts in many states, including, of
course, our own state as far as criminal cases are concerned. The
Model Expert Testimony Act approved in 1937 by the Commissioners
on Uniform Laws (adopted in very few jurisdictions) provides that
the trial judge may, either upon request or upon his own motion, appoint
experts on notice to make report or to testify at the trial. If the parties
agree upon an expert, the judge shall appoint him. The parties may
call additional experts on notice, but the jury is made aware of which
experts were appointed by the judge (obviously for the purpose of
suggesting that such experts' testimony be given more weight) and
costs taxed only for the experts named by the judge. Both parties, of
course, have the right to cross examine the experts called by the judge.50
Finally, after considerable discussion of the matter of the better
utilization by courts of the services and knowledge of experts, 51 Mc-
Cormick concludes: "It may be predicted that all of these opportunities
of the courts for using expert knowledge less clumsily than in a duel
before the jury will be more widely employed in the future. They will
not merely be useful as aids to a more intelligent final trial of the
issue, but they will more and more often render such trial unneces-
sary. 52
50 See UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 59; MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE §§ 402-10.
51 He quotes from many sources, including Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300
(1919) (Brandeis, J.) ; Beuscher, The Use of Experts by the Courts, 54 HARV.
L. REv. 1101 (1941) ; Koerner, Diagnosis and Treatment of Legal Congestion,
22 J. AMi. JUD. Soc'Y 168 (1939) ; Stephens, What Courts Can Learn fromt
Conzinissions, 21 A.B.A.J. 141 (1933).
52 McCoRMICK, op. cit. supra note 41, at 38.
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